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RECENT CASES
BrLLs AND NOTEs-HoLER mN DuE CouRsE-GooD FArrH. For the purpose of inducing defendant to buy a Diesel engine the vendor made certain representations of existing facts, which representations were untrue.
Defendant executed a negotiable promissory note for the purchase price
of the engine, and the vendor indorsed this note to plaintiff, who gave
value therefor. At the time it took the note plaintiff had knowledge
of the representations, but no knowledge that they we-e false. To
plaintiff's suit on the note, defendant set up the defense that the note
was procured by the vendor of the engine by means of fVaudulent representations, of which plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge. The trial
court left to the jury the question of whether or not plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by the vendor, and the
jury found that plaintiff was chargeable with such knowledge. On
appeal it was held that the question was properly left to the jury and
that, accordingly, plaintiff was not a holder in due course and hence
could not recover. (Three of the Judges dirsented.) Peoples Bank &
Trust Go. v. L. Romano Engineering Co., 88 Wash. Dec. 226, 62 P. (2d) 445
(1936).
The case, of necessity, involves a construction of §§ 52 and 56 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (REm. REV. STAT., §§ 3443 and 3447; P. C.,
§§ 4123 and 4127). Since the general adoption of this Act throughout
the United States the gre-t maj6rity of courts have const--ued § 56 of
the N. I. L. to mean precisely what it says: namely, that a purchaser of a
negotiable Instrument has no notice of an infirmity in the instrument
or defect In the title of the negotiator unless he has "actual knowledge
of the infirmity or defect or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." (Italics ours.) Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments (7th ed.) p. 941; Joyce, Defenses to Commercial
Paper (2d ed.) § 689; Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in Negotiable Instruments (1920) 18 Mioe. L. REv. 355. That Washington has
also discarded any notion that negligence or "gross negligence" would,
of itself, make a holder not a holder in due course cannot be controverted. McNamara v. Jose, 28 Wash. 461, 68 Pac. 903 (1902); Gray v.
Boyle, 55 Wash. 578, 104 Pac. 828 (1909); Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534,
114 Pac. 193 (1911); Scandinavian American Bank v. Johnston, 63 Wash.
187, 115 Pac. 102 (1911); Wells v. Duffy, 69 Wash. 310, 124 Pac. 907
(1912); German American Bank v).
Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769
(1915); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Limpright, 93 Wash. 361, 160 Pac.
1046 (1916); Fisk Rubber Co. v. Pinkey, 100 Wash. 220, 170 Pac. 581
(1918) ; Larsen v. Betcher, 114 Wash. 247, 195 Pac. 27 (1921); Westland
v. Post Land Co., 115 Wash. 329, 197 Pac. 44 (1921); Keith v. Tsue Chong,
119 Wash. 507, 205 Pac. 834 (1922) ; Banner Meat Co. v.Rieger, 125 Wash.
142, 215 Pac. 334 (1923); First Nat. Bank v. Gunning, 127 Wash. 307, 220
Pac. 793 (1923); Lovell v. Dotson, 128 Wash. 669, 223 Pac. 1061 (1924);
Mills v. Hayden, 128 Wash. 67, 221 Pac. 994 (1924); Cross v. Voss, 132
Wash. 576, 231 Pac. 929 (1925). Suspicious circumstances or the negligence of the holder may, however, be evidence from which the jury may
infer bad faith. Gray v. Boyle, supra; Scand. Am. Bk. v. Johnston, supra;
Citizens Bk. v. Limpright, supra; Keith v. Tsue Chong, supra; Banner
Meat Co. v. Rieger, supra; Schultz v. Crewdson, 95 Wash. 266, 163 Pac
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734 (1917); Inland Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Cady, 138 Wash. 52, 244 Pac.
123 (1926); Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (5th ed.) p. 574.
Hence the question underlying the principal case is: Were there any
suspicious circumstances connected with plaintiff's taking the note which
would justify a jury in finding that it took the note In bad faith? It is
submitted that there were none. Plaintiff knew of the representations,
but there is no evidence whatever-at least, none is mentioned either
in the opinion or in the briefs of counsel-that either it or its officers
had any knowledge or any grounds for suspecting that the representations were not in fact true. It appears to be settled law in this jurisdiction that one is a bona fide purchaser of a note even though he knew
when he took it that it was the consideration for an executory contract,
or that there were collateral agreements between the payee and the
maker, or that it was given to pay for an article which the payee-vendor
had warranted. Moyses v. Bell, supra; Citizens Bk. v. Limpright, supra;
Cross. v. Voss, supra. A recent collection of authorities may be found
in 100 A. L. R. 1357. Hence there was no evidence on the point of plaintiff's bona fides which justified the trial court's action in leaving that
question to the jury.
It is submitted that the decision is not in accord with the great weight
of authority under the Negotiable Instruments Law, that it is not in
accord with the prior decisions in this state, and that if it is followed its
effect will be, to quote Judge Steinert (dissenting at p. 235), "to emasculate the negotiable instruments law and seriously to cripple the passing
of negotiable instruments."
J. N. R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POLICE POWER-SUNDAY LAWS FOR

BARBER SHOPS. A state statute provided that it shall be unlawful "to
operate or keep open any barber shop or college for more than six days
in any one calendar week." Petitioner was convicted for violation of the
statute and he applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: petitioner
should be released. The statute violates the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the right of citizens to pursue a lawful calling, and forbidding enactment of "special law" where one general in character can be
made applicable. Ex Parte Scaranino, 60 P. (2d) 288 (Cal. 1936).
Statutes which are general in nature and which prohibit the doing
or exercising of any labor or business on Sunday (works of necessity and
charity excepted) have almost universally been upheld. It is stated that
the common law did not prohibit the citizen from pursuing his ordinary
labor on Sunday. Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108 (1896).
The
statute of 29 CAR. II (1678) seems to have laid the foundation for the
laws in England and in many of the states. In their inception, no doubt
these laws were passed with a religious view, and the early cases were
upheld on that ground. Charleston v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. L. 508, 49 Am.
Dec. 608 (S. C. 1847); State v. Barnes, 22 N. D. 18, 132 N. W. 215 (1911);
Ann. Cas. 1913E 930 and note; 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 114 and note. This
view now seems to have been abandoned, and the ground taken that it is
a civil and police regulation. The modern reasoning is that periodical
rest preserves health and promotes good morals. Ex Parte Andrews, 18
Cal. 679 (1861); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086,
41 L. Ed. 166 (1896). The fact that Sunday is the day selected is usually
explained on the ground that the legislature had to select some day, and
it was only natural to pick the day which the majority of the people
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assumed to ,be the day of rest. Specht -. aommonweaZth, 8 Barr. 312
(Penn. 1848).
In Hennington v. Georgia, supra, the court stated that
they had no doubt but that religious views had a controlling influence,
but that that would not invalidate the law if there were a valid police
power underlying it.
But, when legislation singles out barber shops and -prohibits them from
remaining open on Sunday while allowing all other businesses to be carried on, courts split about evenly as to the validity of such laws. Those
denying the validity do so on the grounds of violation of equal protection, due process, and "special legislation" clauses in the Constitutions.
The reasoning in this line of cases is that barbers do not require rest
any more than those in many other lines of business, and that it is unconstitutional to deny this one group the right to labor on Sunday when
the others are exactly in the same relation to the law. EX Parte ffentzsch,
112 Cal. 468, 44 Pac. 803 (1896); Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E.
1108 (1896); Tacoma v. Krech7, 15 Wash. 296, 46 Pac. 255 (1896) (overruled by State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628, 69 Pac. 372 (1902) ). Possibly
these cases reflect a general dislike for Sunday laws of any kind, inasmuch as similar classifications have not been held to violate the equal
protection clause In other fields. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S.
59; 32 Sup. Ct. 192; 56 L. Ed. 350 (1912).
Opposed to the reasoning of
these cases are those which uphold the validity of the statutes as applied
only to barber shops. The usual argument in support of these cases is
that barbers work longer and later hours than those in most occupations,
this being especially true on Saturdays; therefore, there is a reasonable
classification under the Constitution. Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164,
20 Sup. Ct. 66; 44 L. Ed. 716, and note (1900); People v. Havnor, 149
N. Y. 195, 43 N. E. 541 (1896); People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151, 57 N. W.
1094 (1894); State v. Bergfeldt, 41 Wash. 234, 83 Pac. 177 (1905).
The court rejected the contention in the instant case that closing one
day each week would facilitate thorough cleaning of the shops. The
court said that some barber shops might take advantage of the closing
to clean the shops, but there was no reason to believe that all would, or
even a majority. Furthermore, the sanitary practices prescribed by the
California barber laws are such as to require continual observance and
could not be left until the end of the week.
Legislation which prescribes closing hours for barber shops presents
somewhat different constitutional problems. See 8 WAsH. L. REv. 193
(1934); 19 MINN. L. REV. 802 (1935).
R. J. M.
Drsinmt--n-DscIPLinE OF JUDGES. Plaintiff sought an original writ
of prohibition to prevent the Board of Governors of the state bar of
Oklahoma from proceeding against him upon a petition for disbarment
alleging lack of jurisdiction for the reason that, at the time of the acts
charged, he was a judge of one of the county courts of Oklahoma. Plaintiff argued that an attorney cannot be disbarred for acts committed
while he held judicial office because the state bar has no authority to
control or supervise acts of judges, or try accusations against them, and
that while serving as judge he was expressly prohibited from practicing
law and was, therefore, effectively suspended from membership in the
bar. Held: Petition denied. The court said that, while there is no
judicial decision directly in point, the state board of bar governors has
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jurisdiction to hear charges against any practicing lawyer of disbarable
offenses involving moral turpitude rendering him unfit for the continued
practice of the law, even though the offenses evidencing such lack of
character occurred theretofore while he held judicial office. The bar
may "purge itself of unfit members even though they were formerly
judges". Weston v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 61 Pac. (2d) 229
(Okla., 1936).
V. W. T.

EMINENT DOMAIN - EXERCISE FOR MINING PURPOSES - PUBLIC USE.
Plaintiff sought to have 51 feet of tunnel on his neighbor's land condemned for plaintiff's exclusive use in the oweration of his mine. He
sought to exercise the power of eminent domain on the ground that the
tunnel provided the only possible outlet to his mine, and that his mining
operations were in the nature of a public benefit or "public use". Held:
Plaintiff was not entitled to the exercise of that power In this Instance
for it was not conclusively shown that it was necessary to the operation
of his mine, nor that the use he contemplated was more of a benefit to
the public than that to which the defendant devoted it. State ex. rel.
Butte-Los Angeles Mining Co. v. District Court of Second Judicial District
of Silver Bow County, et al., 60 P. (2d) 380 (Mont., 1936).
The term "eminent domain" was unknown to the common law, though
the doctrine itself was carried out by royal prero-ative, as an entry on
private lands in defense of the realm. The granting of the power to
private organizations on the ground that the use contempl:ted was in
the nature of a "public use" and in the furtherance of public Interests
is a modern device, arising out of modern conditions. George v. ConSince It
solidated Lighting Co., et al., 87 Vt. 411, 89 AtI. 635 (1914).
was not a part of the common law, the exercise by private organizations or individuals is by virtue of constitutional grant, and regulation
thereunder is by the legislatures. The enactments of the various states
are substantially the same. Nearly all provide that the right of eminent
domain may be exercised for "public uses", and then enumerate the fields
of private enterprise in which the public has such interest. Ni-v., REV.
LAws, § 5606; UTAH, REV. STAT.,§ § 1898, 3588; IDAHO, REV. CODE, § 5210;
COLO., 3 MILLS ANN. STAT. REV. SUPP. § 616; MONT., REV. CODE §§ 9934,
9936; WASH., REM. REV. STAT. §§ 921-936. (The Washington statute varies
in form.)
In Washington, Colorado and Missouri, contrary to the provision of
the other forty-five states, the constitution provides that the judiciary
and not the legislature shall be the judge as to what constitutes a "public
use". WASH. CONST., Art. 1, § 16. The Washington court holds that
legislative enactments enumerating various "public uses" do not raise
even a presumption that such is the nature of the use. Healy Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681, 99 Am. St. Rep. 918, 56 L. R. A.
820 (1903).
An examination of the cases wherein this power was exercised in the
furtherance of the mining industry, in the extreme northwestern states,
discloses little variance in the opinions of the various state courts upon
the question of whether mining is to be construed a "public use". The
courts of Idaho, Nevada, Utah and Colorado, in which states mining is
important, have found little difficulty in construing its operations as a
"public use". Marsh Mining Co. v. Inland Empire Mining d Milling Co.,
30 Ida. 1, 165 Pac. 1128 (1917); Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Sea-
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well, 11 Nev. 394 (1876); Goldfield Consolidated Milling & Transportation Co. v. Old Sandstrom Annex Gold Mining Co., 38 Nev. 426, 150 Pac.
313 (1915); Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickly, 28 Utah 215,
78 Pac. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas.
1110 (1904); Strickly v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 50 L.
ed. 581, 26 Sup. Ct. 310, 4 Ann. Cas. 117 (1906); Tanner v. Treasury
Tunnel Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464, 4 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 106 (1906). -The principal case from Montana, a' state in which
mining is very important, indicates that Montana follows the general
tendency of the state courts in allowing the exercise of eminent domain
to their leading industries. The plaintiff failed here because he sought
the use of the tunnel to the exclusion of its owner, who was also engaged
in mining. The Montana court merely refused to hold the plaintiff's use
in mining to be a more important "public use" than the use of the tunnel
in mining operations by the defendant. The court a~so held that there
,were shown to be other outlets to the plaintiff's mine.
It is to be doubted whether, in the State of Washington, the denomination of the use as a "public use" would be required in a case such
as the principal one. In Art. I, § 16, of the Washington Constitution, it
is provided, inter alia, that "private property shall not be taken for
private use, except for private ways of necessity * *2. (Italics ours.) In
REM. REV. STAT. § 6747 "ways of necessity" are defined as rights of
way "* * * through the private land of another, for ingress and egress,
and construction and maintenance thereon of * * tunnels * * through
which timber, stone, minerals and other valuable materials and products may be carried." This statute has been held constitutional in State
ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac.
994 (1914). The court has held also that "necessity" means "reasonable
necessity"; State ex rel. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Court,
82 Wash. 503, 144 Pac. 722 (1914). In the former case it was said, with
regard to Const. Wash. Art. I, § 16, that it "excepts the right of ways of
necessity from the general prohibition against the taking of private prop.
erty for private use." Thus, while the said Art. I, § 16, does provide
for the taking of private property for "public use" as well as its taking
for "private use" under the above quoted language, it would seem that
a tunnel for mining purposes would be, within the meaning of REM.
REv. STAT. § 6747, a "way of necessity", for which only a reasonable
necessity, rather than a "public use", need be shown. While the Washington court has not passed on the problem here involved, it is submitted that the foregoing interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions recognizing the right to condemn "ways of necessity"
which are admittedly for private rather than public use permits the
legislative authority to extend the power of eminent domain in furtherance of basic industries and relieves the court of the requirement of
expanding the meaning of the term "public use" beyond its normal
boundaries in sustaining such enactments; which seems a desirable result
in view of the apparent unanimity of opinion in this regard.
B. C. McD.
INSURANCE-EXTEENAL,

VIOLENT

AND

ACCIDENTAL

MEANS-INDEMNITY

PoLIcIEs. The plaintiff, while patronizing the Argonaut Grill, was, without justification, assaulted and severely beaten by one Reed, who at that
time was engaged in the course of his employment as head waiter and
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night manager at the grill. The agreement of the Great American Indemnity Company with the Grill contained this provision: "To pay all
sums which the Assured shall become liable to pay as damages Imposed
by law arising out of -bodily injuries * * * suffered or alleged to have
been suffered as a result of accidents * * * by any person or persons not
in the employ of the Assured while within or upon the premises * * *."
Held: The injuries suffered fell within the terms of the policy. Westerland v. Argonaut Grill, 87 Wash. Dec. 360, 60 P. (2d) 228 (1936).
In defining the term "accident" as including an assault the courts
have generally relied upon cases involving ordinary life and accident
policies as precedents. Courts which have held that a person covered by
an accident policy could recover when assaulted without any fault of his
own have also held that the same rule applies to a public liability policy
where the assault was committed by an employee of the assured and not
by the assured himself, and where the injured party did not provoke the
assault. Hutchcraft's Exr. v. Insurance Co., 87 Ky. 300, 8 S. W. 570
(1904); U. S. Mutual Accident Assn. v. Bony, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct.
755; Utter v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 65 Mich. 545, 32 N. W. 812 (1856);
Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S. W. 723 (1892). In Washington, McGregor v. New World Life Insurance Co., 163 Wash. 677, 1
P. (2d) 908 (1931), furnishes the test in the instant case. It was held
that the death resulted from bodily injuries "effected solely through
external, violent and accidental means", the court saying that "even
though Johnson knew that Clancy and Ludwig were intoxicated, that
they were armed, and that they had been in a fight, he had no reasonable
ground to believe that if he entered the room, a total stranger to them,
without doing anything to provoke trouble he would be immediately
shot." In applying to indemnity policies the rule applied to life insurance and accident policies the court follows the majority. Employer's
Indemnity Corporation v. Grant, 271 Fed. 136 (1921); Rowe v. United
Commercial Traveler's Assn., 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W. 454 (1916); Union
Casualty d- Surety Co. v. Harroll, 98 Tenn. 591, 40 S. W. 1080 (1898);
The
Postlero v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 Cal. 1, 158 Pac. 1022 (1916).
position that injuries from an assault are sustained by "accidental means"
naturally followed from the rule that the policy will be construed most
strictly against the Insurance Co.
In most of the jurisdictions in which it is held that an assault is not
an accident within the meaning of an ordinary accident policy, it is said
that an insurance company is equally exempt from liability under an
indemnity policy. Sontag v. Galer, 279 Mass. 309, 181 N. E. 182 (1932);
Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N. E. 278
(1928); Briggs Hotel Co. v. Zuricc General Accident & Liability Co., 213
Ill. App. 334.
While it appears that no distinction in this respect is made by the
courts between these two types of policies, the propriety of treating them
on the same basis has been questioned on the ground that there is an
essential difference between an accident and health policy and one of
public indemnity. In the latter, both .parties have In mind the common
connotation of the word "accident" and consider its application to the
injured person from the viewpoint of the nature of the assured's act in
causing Injuries to third parties. John J. Francis, Esq., "External, Violent,
and Accidental Means in Indemnity Policies", BEST's INSURANcE NEWS,
W. G. D.
November 10, 1934.
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The will of
STATuTES-INHEsrIANcE TAXES-REPEAL BY ImpLiCATio.
decedent was filed and admitted to probate. The State objected to a
deduction for the federal estate tax paid, pursuant to REM. REV. STAT.,
§ 11201-b. The State contended that as in WASH. LAws 1935, chap. 18,
§ 104, p. 768, the legislature had amended the original inheritance tax
law, WAsH. LAws 1901, chap. 55, p. 67 so as not to include § 11201ob and
had designated specific allowable deductions, and then added "and no
other sum", the deduction was not allowable. Held: REm. REv. STAT.
§ 11201-b was not repealed -by act of 1935 for the reason that repeals by
implication are disfavored and as the legislature had not clearly stated
the section to be repealed, it shall be held in force. In re Colman's Estate, 87 Wash. Dec. 254, 60 P. (2d) 113 (1936).
The original inheritance tax statute in Washington allowed certain
specified deductions from the estate and then included the words "and
no other sum". In 1931 by the WASH. LAws 1931, chap. 134, § 1, p. 401,
REm. REV. STAT. § 11201 was amended to allow a deduction for federal
estate tax paid. This amendment was given a separate section number
(§ 11201-b) apart from § 11201. By WASH. LAWS 1935, suprd, the legislature undertook to amend the original inheritance tax law as passed
in 1901, "as amended, to read as follows", and then set forth what, for
present purposes, may be said to be the original section, continuing it
In force as the amended section, including the use of the original words
"and no other sum" following specified deductions, omitting all references
to the federal estate tax and making no mention of the new section known
as § 11201-b.
In this case there is a difficult problem of determining the legislative
intention. In every case of statutory construction, where the language
Is ambiguous, the Intent and not the language of the act governs. Howlett v. Cheetham~, 17 Wash. 626, 50 Pac. 522 (1897).
The question is: Did the legislature intend to continue § 11201-b In
force? Clearly there was no express repeal of the section in the amendatory act. If the section was repealed, it must have been by implication.
Repeals by implication are never favored by the courts, and unless there
Is a clear showing that the legislature meant to repeal but did not say
so in so many words, the courts will hold that there has been no repeal.
Batchelor v. Paler,
129 Wash. 150, 224 "Pac. 685 (1924). On the other
hand the rule is pretty well established that where a later act embraces
the subject matter of an earlier act and covers it fully and completely,
the earlier act is impliedly repealed, though not expressly and specifically
repealed. Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619, 59 Pac. 507, 75
Am. St. Rep. 862 (1899); In re Donnellan, 49 Wash. 460, 95 Pao. 1085
(1908); State v. George, 84 Wash. 113, 146 Pac. 378 (1915); State ex tel.
McCoske v. Kinnear, 145 Wash. 686, 261 Pac. 795 (1927). And this rule
is applicable even though the two acts are not repugnant. Bradley Engineering & Machinery Co. v. Muzzy, 54 Wash. 227, 103 Pac. 37, 18 Ann.
Cas. 1072 (1909).
These rules are guides for the determination of the legislative intent.
There are conflicting evidences of the legislative intent In the principal
case. The amendatory act clearly stated that its purpose was to amend
the original inheritance tax law of 1901, "as amended". There immediately arises the question: Is § 11201-b an amendment to the original
act? If we conclude that it is, then the present act embraces that section
and according to the rule laid down in Bradley Engineering & Machinery
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Co. v. Muzzy, supra, it should .be repealed by implication. Further. the
act names specific allowable deductions and then adds the words "and
no other sum". Literally speaking, these words are exclusive, and as
such, § 11201-b should be of no force. In the case of In re Rherwood's
Estate, 122 Wash. 648, 211 Pac. 734 (1922), the court held the amount of
the federal estate tax not to be deductible. This decision was based on
the 1917 statute (WASH. LAWS 1917, p. 196) which contained almost
identical provisions as the 1935 amendatory act.
On the other hand the 1931 act, allowing deductions for the federal
tax paid, was given a separate and distinct section number, 11201-b, and
as the legislature made no mention of that section, when it could easily
have done so, It is logical to presume there was no intent to repeal.
It seems from this examination the court could easily have reached
an opposite conclusion as did Judge Blake in his dissenting opinion.
However, the decision gives a desirable result especially in the light of
the Washington court's construction of the theory of our Inheritance
tax law, holding that It is a tax upon the right of succession, State V.
Clarkc, 30 Wash. 439, 71 Pac. 20 (1902), and logically a person doesn't
receive that paid to the federal government.
H. S. M.
OF VOLUNTEEru.
E, engaged In conSURETYSHIP-SUBUOGATION-RIGHT
struction of a state highway, bought four tires from the plaintiff company; sold the tires to four employees, and charged these against
their wages. This action was to collect from the surety on the bond
given by E in accordance with the state statute. No evidence appeared that the tires were used or consumed on the job. Held: That had
the wages not been paid, the employees would have recourse against the
bond and "for all practical purposes the plaintiff company paid the wages
of the employees to the extent of the cost of the tires. While the plaintiff
company holds no assignment from the employees, we think It Is entitled
to recourse against the surety on the theory of subrogation." Western
Steel Casting Co. v. Edland, 87 Wash. Dec. 560 (1936).
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine. It does not owe its origin
to statute or custom, but Is a creature of the courts of equity, having for
its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice between the parties
without regard to form. Murray v. O'Brien, 56 Wash. 361, 105 Pac. 840,
28 L. R. A. (N. S. 998 (1909; Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659, 24
L. ed. 868 (1878). There are several clearly defined groups of cases in
which the right of subrogation is granted by equity.
First, there are those cases where one has discharged obligations in
performance of a legal duty. Whenever a party discharges an obligation
in performance of a legal duty, that is, an obligation for the performance
of which he was legally bound, he is entitled to be subrogated to, and
avail himself of all the securities which may at any time have been put
into the creditors' hands by a party whose liability was prior to his own,
or which the creditor may have obtained from such party. Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 108 Ark. 555, 158 S. W. 1082
(1913); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), (1919) § 2345.
The second class of cases in which the parties are entitled to subrogation consists of situations wherein one, not legally bound to pay, but who
may nevertheless suffer loss if the obligation is not discharged, pays the
debt in self-protection. Murray v. O'Brien, supra; Davison v. Gregory,
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132 N. C. 389, 43 S. E. 916 (1903); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,supra,
1 2346.
The final group in the classification is that in which the payment
is made by a stranger to the obligation, acting neither under compulsion
nor for self-protection, but at the request of some party liable for the
debt. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Napoleon Cotton Oil Co., supra; Davies
v. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253, 99 S. W. 78 (1907) ; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,
#upra, § 2347.
The instant case does not come within any of the above classes in
which equity will relieve. The evidence indicates that the plaintiff sold
the tires to the contractor, relying on the latter's credit, and with the
intention of holding only the buyer. There is no showing that he knew
that the tires were to be used by the employees for their personal use,
nor that a charge would be made against their wages. He did not
discharge an obligation in the performance of a legal duty, since there
was no original obligation; it cannot be said he was a party who paid
a debt in self-protection, for prior to the sale of the tires, no obligations
were due to him; finally, he has not paid a debt at the request of another,
as no request by the contractor appears by the facts; nor can subrogation be invoked when it appears that it was never intended by the
parties. Capen v. Garrison, 193 Mo. 335, 92 S. W. 368 (1906). If we can
say that be did pay a debt, namely the salary of the four employees to
the extent of the tires, he was merely a volunteer and as such is not
entitled to subrogation. Chapman v. Ross, 152 Wash. 262, 277 Pac. 854
(1929); Wagner v. Alderson, 91 Wash. 157, 157 Pac. 476 (1916); Atna
Life Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 31 L. ed. 537, 8 Sup. Ct.
625 (1888).
Certainly under the bond which was the usual statutory one required
by REu. REV. STAT. § 1159, P. C. § 9724, there should be no recovery
because it applies to 'provisions and supplies for carrying on the work
of the contract'. National Surety Co. v. Bratnober Lbr. Co., 67 Wash.
601, 122 Pac. 337 (1912); U. S. Rubber Co. v. American Bonding Co.,
86 Wash. 180, 149 Pac. 706, L. R. A. 1915F 951 (1915).
And lastly If
it be admitted that subrogation be founded on natural justice as stated
in the case of James Dunsmuir v. Port Angeles Gas, Water & Electric
Light & Power Co., 30 Wash. 586, 71 Pac. 9 (1902), the instant case can
hardly be said to fall within the application of such a rule.
D. M. N.
TAXATION-LEVY AND AssEssmENT-FoRTY MILL LIT--SEVENTH-YEAR
DELINQUENCY. Plaintiff brought suit against King County to recover an
amount paid in excess of the ten mill limit permitted to the county by
Initiative Measure No. 94, REm. REV. STAT., 1935 Surp. § 11238-1a, which
provides that "the levy by any county shall not exceed ten mills." The
amount sought in recovery is plaintiff's share of delinquent taxes for
the seventh preceding year as provided by REM. Rsv. STAT. § 11223, requiring the state auditor to transmit to the county assessor a statement
of "the amount due to each state fund and unpaid from such county for
the seventh preceding year, and such delinquent state taxes shall be
added to the amount levied for the current year." The amount of delinquent taxes in 1935 for the seventh preceding year due to the state from
all the counties was in excess of $400,000. The suit was dismissed and
the judgment affirmed upon appeal. Held: There was not a levy of taxes
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as contemplated by the forty mill limit law as there was no action
taken -by the levying authority but merely the performance of a ministerial duty by state and county authorities as required by statute. Four
judges dissented. Greb v. King County, 87 Wash. Dec. 489, 60 P. (2d)
690 (1936).
In taxation the term "levy" has been given a variety of -meanings
and is "in its proper sense . . . the formal and official action of a legislative body invested with the power of taxation. . ." 61 C. J. 551, § 673.
The term is used in a broader sense "indiscriminately to denote the legislative function of charging the collective body of taxpayers with the sums
to be raised, and the ministerial function of extending the taxes against
the individual taxpayers."
(Italics supplied.) 36 C. J. 1032, § 3. The
court, reluctantly admitting the possibility of plurality of meaning ot
"levy", limited the scope of that word to action taken by the levying
authority and concluded that the amount of the seventh-year delinquency
was not "a new levy in the sense that it is included within the limitations of the initiative" as only a ministerial function was involved. The
delinquency provision was characterized as "an accounting process" for
"the collection, in the current year, of the tax already due from the
property and inhabitants of the county" and so the purpose of the initiative was not "to disturb the existing machinery" for tax collection but
"to superimpose upon the existing tax structure specific limitations"
regarding the levy of future taxes for current governmental purposes.
That the delinquency provision is something more than "an accounting process" is suggested by the court in recognition of the strongest
argument against its position. In the words of the court, "the inclusion
of the amount when spread anew becomes a specific burden on the individual properties within the county, including properties that have already paid the seventh-year tax." (Italics supplied.) The tax burden of
the county was not increased and the court concluded that "since the
aggregate property of the county remains burdened with the delinquency,
every unit of it is subject to a contribution to liquidate the burden."
The dissenting opinion stresses and vigorously upholds the right of
the people to limit the taxing power of the county through the use of the
initiative. Love v. King Coftnty, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P. (2d) 175 (1935).
This proposition, not disputed by the majority of the court, apparently
influenced the dissenting judges to conclude that the intent of the people
as expressed through the initiative was for a broad and non-technical
use of the term "levy" which would be fully effective to reduce governmental expenses through restrictions on the power of taxation. In the
words of the minority, "But, assuming that the statute simply provides
a process for collecting that which belongs to the state, that process is
exercised through a levy for taxes. . . They have said that the process
for collecting taxes shall not be exercised beyond certain prescribed
limitations." In view of the broad construction ordinarily given to "levy",
the decision of the court construing the word so narrowly would seem
to be unusual in a situation where the electorate has so clearly expressed
an intention to limit taxation. The limitation of "levy" to action taken
only by the levying authority might very well open the way to frustration of the tax limit law.
E. H. H.

